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Comments
The Use Of Public Funds By Private Schools
via Educational Vouchers: Some
Constitutional Problems
The 1971 California Legislature considered a bill which would
have given an educational voucher to the parents of school child-
ren; the voucher would have been utilized to pay for the secu-
lar education of the child. The child's education could have been
received at a private or parochial school as well as a public school.
The question of a violation of the first amendment to the U.S. Con-
stitution is immediately raised when public funds are given to
religious schools. This comment discusses the educational
voucher system as it would have been established by Assembly Bill
150. In addition to the problem of a possible violation of the
first amendment, the author considers the California Constitution's
prohibition against giving public monies to any private school. The
possibility of the legislation encouraging segregation in the school
system is also discussed.
At the end of the 1970 school year over four million children were
attending California primary and secondary schools.' Section 12101
of the California Education Code provides:
Each person between the ages of 6 and 16 years not exempted
under the provisions of this chapter is subject to compulsory full-
time education. Each person subject to compulsory full-time edu-
cation . . . not exempted under the provisions of Chapter 7 [by
attendance at a private school] shall attend the public full-time
day school .... 2
This provision of the Education Code exemplifies similar compulsory
education provisions in all the states. In allowing a parent to comply
with the law by sending his or her child to an accredited private school,
1. California Senate Office of Research; Analysis of S.B. 1204, 1970 Regular
Session, May 22, 1970.
2. CAL. EDuc. CODE § 12101.
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the law effectively establishes a dual school system, one public the
other private. Some persons feel that this present dual system has cre-
ated inequities in the educational process.'
The quality of education a child receives in a California public school
is directly related to the wealth of the child's particular school dis-
trict. 4  Therefore, it can be argued that almost all of the higher qual-
ity schools are found in the wealthier districts.5 For this reason only
relatively affluent parents have any real control over the quality of ed-
ucation their child receives. Should parents living in a higher quality
school district be dissatisfied with the neighborhood school, they can
afford to send their children to private schools. If these parents do
not wish to pay the tuition costs of a private school, they can afford
to move into a better school district. Critics of the present system
argue that children of low or median income parents have only one edu-
cational opportunity, the public school in their district. 6
It could be argued that "wealth" is not the sole criteria in assessing
the educational opportunity of California's children. Should a par-
ent happen to be a member of religious denomination that maintains a
relatively low-tuition school in their district, a child may be able to at-
tend an excellent church school even though his parents have only
a low or medium income. Often however, these schools are operating
at full capacity and the child may have to wait for a considerable per-
iod of time before he or she can be accepted.7  The existence of some
low-tuition religious schools does not appear to seriously challenge the
proposition that our present dual educational system is inequitable.
Critics of the present system argue that private schools cannot com-
pete with public schools because of rising education costs.8 In effect,
3. Advocate Milton Friedman speaking in favor of Voucher proposals during
the television talk show, The Advocates, K.C.E.T. Los Angeles, October 20, 1970, at 8.
Text on file in the Pacific Law Journal office. See also, statement of Assemblyman
William Campbell, relative to school financing, April 1970 at 1, on file in the
Pacific Law Journal office.
4. Public school systems are supported primarily by property taxes. The
greater the property value in the neighborhood school district, the higher the tax base
will be, leading to more revenue which can be used in support of the local schools. A
district surrounded by property at higher value than the next district, will be able to
afford newer, and better equipped schools.
5. Recently the California supreme court in Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584,
589 (1971), held that the
California public school financing system, with its substantial dependence
on local property taxes and resultant wide disparities in school revenue, vio-
lates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We have
determined that this funding scheme invidiously discriminates against the poor
because it makes the quality of a child's education a function of the wealth
of his parents and neighbors, . . . we can discern no compelling state purpose
necessitating the present method of financing.
6. Friedman, The Case for a Voucher System, HuMAN EvENTs, March 21, 1970
at 8.
7. Catholic Schools of California Newsletter, vol. 1, no. 2, May 20, 1970, at 1.
8. Id.
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the compulsory education law is creating a monopoly within the ed-
ucational systemY During the past six years, in California alone, fif-
ty-one Catholic elementary and secondary schools have closed their
doors for financial reasons.1 0 At the end of the 1970 school year,
three hundred and seventy thousand students, one out of every eleven
in California, were attending non-public elementary and secondary
schools. 1
In California it costs approximately seven-hundred and twenty-five
dollars a year in tax revenue to educate one child in a public institu-
tion."2 As private schools close, the existing public schools are faced
with the task of absorbing these children into already over-crowded
classrooms. If all the private schools in California were to close today,
the added cost to the taxpayer would be over two-hundred and fifty-
million dollars a year."s
1971 School Financing Legislation: The Voucher System.
In an attempt to solve the present school financing problem and
more evenly distribute existing school tax funds, two major school fi-
nance reform bills were introduced in the 1971 California legislative
session.' 4 These bills were designed to erase the -unequal contribution
by property owners in supporting their neighborhood public schools. 15
In an attempt to rectify the educational as well as financial inequities
of the present system, a proposal establishing a "voucher" system of
school financing, on an experimental basis, was introduced. 10 A.B.
150 would have added chapter 2.5 to Division 22 of the Education
Code entitled The Elementary Demonstration Scholarship Act of 1971.
The California voucher system would not have changed the tax struc-
ture. It was designed to change the present method of allocating tax
revenue by allowing for a specific and equal amount of money for
each school age child attending a school which participates in the
demonstration program.'1  A demonstration board"8 would have
9. See note 6 supra.
10. Sacramento Union, Jan. 14, 1971, at 3, col. 4.
11. See note 1 supra.
12. See note 7 supra.
13. Determined by multiplying the number of students currently enrolled in pri-
vate educational institutions, by the average yearly costs of educating a child in the
public school system.
14. The two bills, A.B. 1406 by Assemblyman Leroy Greene and S.B. 801 by
Senator Albert Rodda were written at the request of the State Board of Education.
They are supported by all of the most powerful state-wide education groups. See
Sacramento Bee, May 19, 1971, §B, at 2, col. 1.
15. A.B. 1406, 1971 Regular Session. S.B. 801, 1971 Regular Session.
16. A.B. 150, 1971 Regular Session.
17. A.B. 150, 1971 Regular Session Proposed. CAL. FDuc. CoDE §31184(a) pro-
vided that (t)here shall be a basic scholarship equal in amount to every other basic
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awarded scholarships to each elementary school child residing in the
demonstration area.19 The scholarship funds were to be made avail-
able to the parents or legal guardian of the child in the form of a
voucher, and could have been redeemed solely for educational pur-
poses. 20  The child would have been eligible to enroll in any participat-
ing school and present his voucher in full payment of a tuition
charge.21 The school would then redeem the voucher for the face
amount.
Proponents of the voucher system claim the plan will introduce a
healthy competitive spirit into our school system.22  Participating
schools will be forced to keep their level of instruction at least as high
as other area schools or attendance will fall, forcing the school to close.
A primary aim of the program is to open the door to new and inno-
vative ideas in education, perhaps in the form of new schools. Ideally
this would produce a school system with many diverse types of schools.
The proponents of the new plan argue that the voucher would, most
importantly, offer the children of the poor; the minorities; the citizens
handicapped by culture, race and language barriers the opportunity to
attend the newer, cleaner, and more advanced schools of the so
called "outer-city."23
A discussion of the social and economic issues involved with a
voucher system will be left to other writers.2 4  This comment will an-
scholarship for (not to) every eligible student in the demonstration area. Subdivision
(b) provided that compensatory scholarships shall be given to disadvantaged children
in addition to the basic scholarship.
18. Proposed CAL. EDuc. CODE § 31176(C) "Demonstration board" means a
board established by the participating local board to conduct an elementary demonstra-
tion scholarship program ....
19. Proposed CAL. EDUC. CODE § 31183.5.
20. Id.
21. Proposed CAL. EDuc. CODE § 31158. Subdivision (c) of Section 31185 pro-
vides that the participating school must not levy a tuition, fee or charge above the
value of the education scholarship [the voucher].
22. See note 6 supra.
23. See testimony of Mrs. Ester Swanker, former Assistant to the Commissioner
of Education for the State of New York. Hearings on A.B. 150, before the Cal-
ifornia Assembly Ways and Means Committee, May 26, 1971, p. 7. Text on File in
the office of Assemblyman Leo J. Ryan, California State Capitol, Sacramento, Cal-
ifornia. See also, Freidman, supra note 6, at 6. The legality of having the govern-
ment expend money for the use of the children in getting to and from school was up-
held in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). As a practical matter,
some limit will have to be drawn as to the distance a child may be allowed to travel
to attend school. In Los Angeles, perhaps a ten mile limit would be sufficient. In
places such as Alpine County however, there will be problems since the area's popula-
tion is not conducive to a large number of schools.
24. Such issues include the amount of the voucher, and whether it should be on a
sliding scale or at a flat rate, geared to the average cost of educating a child in a
public school, and whether a parent should be allowed to supplement his child's vou-
cher. Selection of students will pose additional problems, especially when dealing with
the mentally retarded youngster or the slow learner. It will cost more to educate this
type of student. There will also be problems in setting up boundary lines. This
could lead to gerrymandering whereby a rich district could use its influence to exclude
a neighboring underdeveloped area. Busing costs, and how they would be worked into
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alyze the constitutional issues raised by legislation which implements a
voucher system for financing "public" education. There are three ma-
jor issues to consider in analyzing the constitutionality of school
voucher financing legislation in California.
1. Does this type of legislation violate articles IX and XIII of the
California Constitution?
2. Does it violate the establishment of religion clauses of the fed-
eral and state constitution?
3. Does the legislation violate the equal protection clause of the
federal constitution by encouraging segregated schools?
Articles IX and XIII of the California Constitution
Section 25 of article XIII of the California Constitution prohibits
the legislature from making gifts of public money or things of value to
any individual, municipal, or other corporation .2  The argument can
be made that voucher funds will be used to benefit, private entrepre-
neurs owning individual schools, as well as religious denominations
which own or control a participating parochial school.2 However, pro-
ponents of the voucher system contend that the primary benefit from
these funds will be to the children whose parents use the voucher to
pay their child's tuition costs. Since they will be available to each
and every school-age child who chooses to be educated in a voucher-
supported school system, the funds are in effect being used for a "pub-
lic purpose".
The California supreme court has held that funds used for a public
purpose are not a gift within the meaning of section 25 of article
.II=.
2
7 The court continued by stating that
The determination of what constitutes a public purpose is pri-
marily a matter for legislative discretion . . . (citations omitted)
which is not disturbed by the courts so long as it has a reasonable
basis. 2
8
It seems apparent that providing for the education of children in gen-
eral is a public purpose since it enhances the general welfare. The
the amount of the voucher will also be difficult to determine. The overall administra-
tion of the plan, whether it be by a state agency, or an independent group, poses in-
teresting constitutional as well as practical problems.
25. CAL. CONsT. art. XIII, § 25.
26. See California Teachers Association Report of February 2, 1971, p. 12.
27. It is well settled that in determining whether an appropriation of public
funds or property is to be considered a gift, the primary question is whether
the funds are to be used for a public purpose or a private purpose. If they are
for a public purpose, they are not a gift within the meaning of section 31 of
article IV, [now section 25 art. Xii].
County of Alameda v. Janssen, 16 Cal. 2d 276, 281 (1940).
28. Id.
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California supreme court has taken a liberal view in determining
what expenditures serve a public purpose in promoting education.29
Expenditures under a voucher plan are factually distinguishable from
expenditures for textbooks or transportation. However, the effect is
the same, the equalizing of educational opportunities.
The most convincing argument that the voucher plan does not vio-
late article XIII is that the funds are not being "given" to the schools in
the traditional sense of a "gift." A school will have to maintain
sufficient accreditation standards to remain eligible for the funds.3"
The school will therefore be providing a valuable service to the state for
which it will receive compensation. If the school can operate so effi-
ciently that it can educate each child for less than the face amount
of the voucher, it will profit. Thus, a private school may incidentally
benefit from the expenditure of voucher funds, but the mere fact that
private individuals or corporations benefit from the expenditure of funds
for a public purpose does not mean the expenditure consitutes a gift
within the meaning of article XII[.3
Article IX section 8 of the California Constitution, on its face, appears
to prohibit the payment of any voucher funds to a private or parochial
school. Article IX, section 8 provides:
No public money shall ever be appropriated for the support of
any sectarian or denominational school, or any school not under
the exclusive control of the officers of the public schools .... 32
It appears that all private schools receiving voucher funds must be
exclusively controlled by public school officers. This would be true un-
der a literal interpretation of article IX section 8 even though the
voucher plan meets the primary public purpose tests of article XII sec-
tion 25 and the private school is not a sectarian school. The language
in section 8 of this article indicates that any voucher legislation will
have to contain a provision amending article IX or all private schools
will have to become "public" schools.33
29. 30 CAL. Ops. ATr'Y GEN. 63 (1957). MacMillan Co. v. Clarke, 184 Cal.
491 (1920); Pasadena City High School Dist. v. Upjohn, 206 Cal. 775 (1929).
30. A.B. 150, 1971 Regular Session. Proposed CAL. EDuc. CODE § 31185.
31. Analysis of Proposed Educational Voucher Plans, prepared by the Legisla-
tive Council of California, October 8, 1970 pursuant to request number 18184, at 2, on
file in the office of Assemblyman Leo J. Ryan, California State Capitol, Sacramento,
California. See also, 30 CAL. Ops. Arr'Y GEN. 63 (1957).
32. CAL. CoNsT. art. IX, § 8.
33. Although there are no decisions construing this particular provision of sec-
tion 8, there is dicta in a 1970 California District Court of Appeals decision which
may provide some support for privately-backed voucher administration. In California
State Employee's Association v. Williams, 7 Cal. App. 3d 390, 398, 399 (1970), the
court commented on the acceptability of combining public and private services
when the needs of the community so demand. See People v. Western Air Lines,
Inc., 42 Cal. 2d 621, 635 (1954).
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During the 1970 session of the California Legislature two proposals
were introduced to either revise or delete the restrictive provisions of
article IX and II.4  Both of these proposed constitutional amend-
ments died in the Assembly Education Committee. Only one proposed
amendment to section 8 of article IX was introduced in the 1971
session. 5 This proposed amendment also failed to pass.
A.B. 150 attempted to avoid the necessity of amending the re-
strictive provision of article IX by broadly defining "public school. '38
The bill would have added Section 21176 to the Education Code; sub-
division (e) of Section 31176 defining public school "for the purposes
of this chapter" to mean
any elementary school which admits students to kindergarten and
grades 1 to 8, inclusive, residing in the demonstration area with-
out distinction to location of residence, race, creed, color, national
origin, economic status, religion, or political affiliation, and which is
otherwise qualified to negotiate vouchers under the provision of
this chapter.87
Proposed section 31185 of the Education Code defined public schools as
those which are "otherwise qualified to negotiate vouchers." Sec-
tion 31185 would have allowed parents to use the vouchers at a school
which:
(a) Meets all health and safety standards required by law.
(b) Does not discriminate against the admission of students and
the hiring of teachers on the basis of race, creed, color, na-
tional origin, economic status, religion, or political affliation
and has filed a certificate with the State Board of Education
that the school is in compliance with Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Public Law 88-352); ....
(c) In no case levies or requires any tuition, fee, or charge
above the value of the education scholarship.
(d) Is not controlled by any religious creed, church or sectarian
denomination except as provided in Section 31186.
(e) Provides public access to all financial and administrative
records and provides to the parent or guardian of each eli-
gible child in the demonstration area comprehensive infor-
mation, on the courses of study offered, curriculum, ma-
terials and text-books, the qualifications of the teachers, ad-
ministrators, and paraprofessionals employed, the minimum
34. A.C.A. 13, 1970 Regular Session; A.C.A. 69, 1970 Regular Session.
35. A.C.A. 9, 1971 Regular Session.
36. A.B. 150, 1971 Regular Session.
37. Proposed CAL. EDUC. CODE § 31176. A.B. 150, 1971 Regular Session.
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schoolday, the salary schedules, the actual amount of money
spent per pupil, and such other information as may be re-
quired by the demonstration board.
(f) Provides periodic reports to the parents on the average pro-
gress of the pupils enrolled; ....
(g) Offers a comprehensive course of study in the basic areas
of reading; mathematics; and the English language; ....
(h) Maintains a register of reports, including monthly attend-
ance, and any other information as may be required by the
demonstration board;
(i) Prohibits instruction, or advocacy of, the violent overthrow of
the United States or California state government; ....
(j) Is a public school as defined in subdivision (e) of Section
31176.38
Even though public schools were defined in such a manner to in-
clude "private" schools for purposes of the chapter establishing an ex-
perimental voucher plan, it seems unlikely that these private schools
could be said to be under the exclusive control of public school officials,
as section 8 of Article IX requires. There are no court decisions con-
struing the "exclusive control of the officers of the public schools," pro-
vision in article IX. However, the Fourth District Court of Appeal
in Bowker v. Baker39 concluded that the use of public school buses to
transport private school children did not violate section 8 article IX.
40
In the Bowker case a local school board, adopted a resolution un-
der the authority of Section 16254 of the Education Code41 which au-
thorized transportation for private school children on public school
buses. The court upheld the school board's authority to pass the
resolution. The private school children attended a school operated
by the Roman Catholic Church. The court reasoned that even if part
of the benefit resulting from the legislation was not directly permitted
by law, as long as its aim was to solve legitimate and compelling
state problems and the means selected were reasonable, the legislation
should stand.42 The legislation authorizing transportation of private
38. Proposed CAL. EDuC. CODE § 31185. A.B. 150, 1971 Regular Session.
39. Bowker v. Baker, 73 Cal. App. 2d 653 (1946).
40. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 8.
41. CAL. EDuc. CODE § 16806 provides that by way of CAL. EDuC. CODE
§ 12154, a local school board may allow pupils entitled to attend the public schools
in the district, the right to receive the same bus transportation even though they
choose to attend a private school in the district. (As noted in the opinion, section
16806, was formerly section 16257, and section 12154, was formerly section 16624).
42. The Court maintained:
. . [Tjhat where the main purpose of an enactment is lawful, and an inci-
dental or immaterial benefit results to some person or organization, which
benefit is not directly permitted by law, this incidental benefit alone will
not defeat the legislation, its main purpose being lawful.
73 Cal. App. 2d 653, 663 (1946).
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school children on public school buses was intended to protect the
children by keeping them off dangerous streets."8  The court con-
cluded that the statute was not "appropriating money for the support"
of a private, parochial school in violation of article IX section 8 but
was primarily intended to benefit and protect school-age children. The
benefit to the parochial school was incidental and the cost to the lo-
cal public school district was insignificant.""
If proponents of the voucher system rely on the Bowker case in ar-
guing that the voucher system does not violate article IX section
8, it seems they must show that the primary benefit is to the "pub-
lic" and any benefit to parochial schools, or schools not under the ex-
clusive control of public school officials, is merely incidental.'6
In doing this, proponents of the voucher system contend the sys-
tem is designed to erase the educational inequities in our present sys-
tem. 46 One of the primary objectives is to offer greater freedom for
a parent or child in choosing a school."7 Since a parent will pre-
sumably choose the "best" school in his area, the schools will have to
compete and the quality of education in general will rise. Secondly,
if there is a fixed amount that the schools receive for each voucher,"8
the schools will try to provide a quality education as efficiently as
possible. This might result in a reduction in tax revenues needed for
education.
The argument can also be made that the voucher system is not tech-
nically an appropriation of public funds to a non-public school. The
funds are given directly to the child's parents in the form of a voucher.
However, the voucher can only be used for education; therefore it must
be given to the school which then redeems it and receives cash directly
from the state. But proponents of the voucher system can argue that
article IX section 8 should be literally construed; there is no direct
appropriation of funds but merely the "cashing" of a voucher. Since
the parents decide which school will receive the voucher and thereby
the money, there is no state participation in the decision.
With respect to article IX section 8 of the California Constitution, the
courts may literally construe this provision and conclude that the
voucher system is not an "appropriation" of public funds to private
schools.
43. Id. at 665.
44. Id. at 666.
45. See note 44 supra.
46. See note 6 supra.
47. A.B. 150, 1971 Regular Session. Proposed CAL. EDUC. CODE § 31175. See
also Kirk, Free Choice: A Voucher Plan, NATIONAL REv., June 17, 1969, at 598.
48. A.B. 150, 1971 Regular Session. Proposed CAL. Enuc. CODE § 31184.
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SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE:
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
Will the courts look to the technical form of voucher legislation if
this type of legislation is challenged as a violation of the establishment
clauses in the United States and California Constitutions?
Since the first amendment to the United States Constitution has
been held applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment,49
federal law must be examined to determine the minimum require-
ments for maintaiining the separation of church and state.
The United States Supreme Court has upheld legislation which au-
thorized construction grants to a hospital controlled and staffed by
members of the Catholic Church.50 In attempting to avoid conflict with
the religious prohibitions of the first amendment, the hospital charter
forbids any type of religious activities from taking place in the institu-
tion. Parochial schools, participating in a voucher plan, will have
more difficulty in setting up a non-sectarian program of this nature.
Much of their curriculum is devoted to the study and promotion of
religious ideals. Religious schools will apparently have to overcome
the effect of ringing church bells; robed nuns and brothers who act
as professors; mandatory attendance in catechism classes; and reli-
gious symbols being used to illustrate ideas; before a government aid
program will be sustained, even though it may be programed to only
secular activities. 1
The first major decision in the area of government aid to non-public
school children was Everson v. Board of Education52 which upheld a
statute authorizing reimbursement of money expended for children's
bus fares to and from private, and parochial schools. The Court based
its decision on the fact that this was public welfare legislation, hence pub-
lic funds could be used to aid the parents of these children.53 The
Court's main consideration was for the safety of the children in get-
ting to and from school. 4 The Court concluded that any benefit re-
cevied by parochial schools was an incidental by-product of the legis-
lationY Any benefit to the school from increased enrollment because
of the government sponsored transportation was incidental to the pri-
mary effect and purpose of the legislation and occurred because of the
parent's decision to send his child to a private school. Justice Black,
49. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1942).
50. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
51. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
52. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1946).
53. Id. at 6.
54. Id. at 7.
55. Id. at 18.
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writing for the majority suggested that the decision carried to "the
verge" of forbidden territory under the establishment clause of the
first amendment,56 but it was felt that providing the sectarian schools
with secular, neutral and non-ideological services of this type,
would not offend the main objective of the establishment clause.57
In restricting voucher funds to secular purposes however, the fund-
ing agencies may have to continuously supervise the schools which
receive the funds. This may result in excessive involvement between
government and the religious schools.58 However, it would seem the
more serious problem is to actually limit the funds to purely secular
purposes. Can the parochial schools use the funds for building main-
tenance when the building is used for religious as well as secular educa-
tion? If the church does not have funds to maintain the school with-
out the use of voucher funds, then these funds would be used to aid
religious as well as secular education.
However, proponents of the voucher may argue that public voucher
funds could be used to maintain the building only in proportion to
the secular educational use of the building. If the building is used 50
percent of the time for secular education, voucher funds can be applied
to pay for 50 percent of the maintenance costs. Assembly Bill 150
would have allowed parochial schools to participate in the demonstration
program provided they "meet all other requirements for eligibility in-
cluding the provision in subdivision (a) of section 31182" (Education
Code).51 Subdivision (a) section 31182 provided that all funds "shall
be expended exclusively for the secular education of students."60 As
amended on February 24, A.B. 150 further provided that "adequate
records shall be maintained by schools to prove that no public funds
are used to support any portion of any sectarian education." This
section, later amended out of A.B. 150,61 may have created an ex-
cessive entanglement between the state and church in light of the recent
United States Supreme Court decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman.12
Lemon v. Kurtzman
The United States Supreme Court has recently decided two cases in-
volving public financial assistance for parochial schools. 8 In Tilton v.
56. Id. at 16.
57. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
58. 403 U.S. 602, 609 (1971). See discussion in text infra.
59. Proposed CAL. EDJUC. CODE § 31182. A.B. 150, 1971 Regular Session.
60. A.B. 150, 1971 Regular Session.
61. Id. This provision of A.B. 150 was amended out of the final version soon
after the Lemon decision was banded down. See note 89 infra.
62. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
63. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 and Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672 (1971).
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Richardson4 the Court concluded that the use of federal funds for
building construction at colleges and universities controlled by religious
denominations was not a violation of the first amendment's "estab-
lishment clause." However, in Lemon v. Kurtzman65  the Court
concluded that Pennsylvania and Rhode Island legislation subsidizing
secular education in elementary parochial schools did violate the Es-
tablishment Clause.66
In both the Tilton and Lemon cases the Court noted that the Estab-
lishment Clause was designed to afford protection against "sponsor-
ship, financial support, and active involvement of the soveriegn in re-
ligious activity".6 7  In both cases the Court relied on the same cri-
teria in assessing the constitutional validity of the legislation being chal-
lenged.
First the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second
its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion (citation omitted); finally, the statute must not
foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religions.'68
In both the Lemon and Tilton cases the Court found a secular
legislative purpose;6 9 in Lemon the Court noted that the Pennsylvania
and Rhode Island statutes "clearly state that they are intended to en-
hance the quality of the secular education in all schools covered by
the compulsory attendance laws.1 70  The Court concluded that since
"a state always has a legitimate concern for maintaining minimum
standards in all schools it allows to operate . . ." and there is nothing
to undermine the stated legislative purpose, there was a secular legisla-
tive purpose to the statutes.
7'1
The second criteria used in Lemon was applied in Board of Educa-
tion v. A llen7 2 to uphold legislation authorizing the use of public
textbooks by students in parochial schools. The primary effect and
benefit of the legislation was to the children who received the books.
Only secular textbooks were given to the children. If there was any
benefit to the parochial schools it was very minor and indirect; i.e.,
the schools might have benefited if more parents sent their children
to the parochial school because the legislation reduced the cost of the
parochial education by an amount equal to the cost of the books. 73
64. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
65. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
66. Id. at 625.
67. Id. at 612. See Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
68. Id.
69. 403 U.S. 672; 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
70. 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
71. Id. at 613.
72. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
73. Id.
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In Lemon the Court mentioned the primary benefit criteria only
briefly.
We need not decide whether these legislative precautions [allow-
ing the funds to be used for purely secular education] restrict the
principal or primary effect of the programs to the point where they
do not offend the Religion Clauses, for we conclude that the cumula-
tive impact of the entire relationship arising under the statutes in
each State involves excessive entanglement between government
and religion.74
Rhode Island had provided for a 15 percent salary supplement to
teachers at non-public schools whose average per-pupil expenditure to
secular education was below the average in public schools. 7 Penn-
sylvania had authorized the State Superintendent of Public Instruction to
"purchase" certain "secular educational services" from non-public
schools, directly reimbursing the schools for teacher salaries, the costs of
textbooks, and instructional materials. 76  The facts of the Allen case,
where the primary benefit criteria was applied, were distinguished by
the Court in the Lemon case. The secular books loaned by the state in
Allen were given directly to the children." In a voucher system the
aid goes directly to the child or his parents. This would seem to make
a voucher system analogous to the type of aid given in Everson and Al-
len and distinguishes voucher financing legislation from the direct aid
of the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island legislation struck down in Lemon.
However, in Lemon the Court discussed the issue of direct versus in-
direct aid only briefly." The Court instead placed heavy emphasis
on the excessive entanglement issue and the distinction between the
government's providing secular, neutral aid such as books, transpor-
tation, lunches, etc. and the payment of teacher salaries:71
In order to determine whether the government entanglement with
religion is excessive, we must examine the character and purposes
of the institutions which are benefited, the nature of the aid that the
State provides, and the resulting relationship between the govern-
ment and the religious authority (emphasis added).80
The Court found that in order to assure money spent for teacher sala-
ries in parochial schools was used solely for secular education, the state
would have to engage in "a comprehensive, discriminating and con-
74. 403 U.S. 602, 613-614 (1971).
75. Id. at 607.
76. Id. at 609, 610.
77. 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968).
78. 403 U.S. 602, 621 (1971).
79. Id. at 615-620.
80. Id. at 615.
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tinuing" surveillance of the parochial schools.8' The Court felt it would
be difficult for a dedicated religious teacher to avoid a sectarian bias
in his or her teaching.8 The Court concluded that this necessary state
surveillance was an excessive entanglement between church and state. 8
The Pennsylvania statute contained a provision very similar to the
February 24th amended version of Assembly Bill 150 84-the schools
must maintain records to prove the funds are used exclusively for secu-
lar education.' The Court noted that almost all direct grants by gov-
ernment have been accompanied by varying measures of control and
surveillance.86 The Pennsylvania statute's provision for a government
auditing was an additional reason for finding excessive entanglement be-
tween church and state.
8 7
The California voucher proposal embodied in Assembly Bill 150
can be distinguished from the Pennsylvania legislation struck down in
Lemon because the California plan would have given the aid to the
children and their parents. 8 It can then be argued that there is no
violation of the establishment clause because there is a legislative pur-
pose which neither aids nor inhibits religion. The children through
their choice of schools confer a benefit on the parochial school. How-
ever, this would ignore the substantive effect of the act and focus solely
on the technical form of the aid. 9 Proponents of the voucher system
can argue that "freedom of choice" is not a device to allow the legisla-
ture to do indirectly that which it is forbidden to do directly; therefore,
the legislation should not be considered a "law respecting the establish-
ment of religion." But the Rhode Island statute gave the aid, in the
form of teacher salary supplements, directly to the teachers and there-
fore this statute should have been valid since it aided teachers and did
not "establish a religion." Thus, it seems proponents of the voucher
system would have to distinguish Lemon on the grounds that vouchers
go to children not teachers. This would appear to be a meaningless
distinction if voucher legislation involves the same excessive entangle-
ment between the church and state.




84. Id. at 621. See also A.B. 150, 1971 Regular Session.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 619.
87. Id. at 622.
88. See A.B. 150, 1971 Regular Session.
89. Choper, Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 CALiF. L. Rlv. 260, 313 (1968):
Although this theory [child benefit theory] may be characterized as a 'work-
able compromise interpretation of the first Amendment' it places form over
substance.
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Assembly Bill 150 which was designed to prevent the use of funds for
religious education (separate accounting of voucher funds) might have
been the very provision which would have invalidated the legislation.
The Court in Lemon may have created an unsolvable dilemma for pro-
ponents of the voucher system. If they don't restrict the use of voucher
funds to secular education, it seems they will fail to satisfy the second
criteria, namely aid which "advances. . . religion." But if they restrict
the funds to secular education, there will be an excessive entanglement
between the church and state since the state must continually inspect
the parochial school to see that no religious education is financed by
public voucher funds.9 0
Professor Choper, in a recent law review article,9' argued that gov-
ernment financial aid should "be extended directly or indirectly to sup-
port parochial schools without violation of the establishment clause so
long as such aid does not exceed the value of the secular educational
service rendered by the school. '9 2  The argument that "control follows
aid" and such control breaches the wall of separation between church
and state was criticized by Professor Choper.9 3 Since the state has a
basic interest in promoting children's welfare through adequate secular
education, the state already has the power to supervise and inspect
parochial schools.94 Therefore, why should financial aid to the school
create an excessive entanglement between church and state?
There are a great many instances of the government paying a reli-
gious organization for secular services.90 Furthermore, there are state
90. The Lemon case was decided on June 28, 1971; on September 16, 1971,
A.B. 150 was amended to strike the provision which required that schools maintain
adequate records to show that no public funds were being used for sectarian education.
See A.B. 150, 1971 Regular Session, as amended, September 16, 1971. It seems clear
that this amendment was added to comply with the excessive entanglement criterion
enunciated in Lemon. However the provision which requires that the funds be used
exclusively for secular education remained. Therefore, the demonstration board must
become "involved" with the parochial school in order to see that the funds are used
solely for secular education. Thus, there may be "excessive entanglement" even
though the schools are not required to keep records. Proponents can argue that the
statute is not unconstitutional because it does not mandate excessive entanglement."
However, it can also be argued that mandatory use of the funds exclusively for secular
education, impliedly requires an excessive entanglement with religion and therefore
the participation of parochial schools in the program violates the constitution.
91. Choper, supra note 89.
92. Id. at 265.
93. Id. at 329
94. Id. at 328.
95. T. EMERSON, D. HABER, AND N. DOTSEN, 1 POLITIcAL AND CIviL RiORTs IN
THE UNIrED STATES 769 (1967).
Programs of federal aid to religious institutions prior to 1965 included aid to private
denominational hospitals under the Hospital Survey and Construction Act, 60 Stat.
1041 (1946) as amended, 42 U.S.C. 291; see R. DRNAN, RELIGION, TIlE COURTS, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 37 (1963); lunches to parochial school children under the National
School Lunch Act, 60 Stat. 233 (1946) as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1759; payment for the
education of Supreme Court pages in private schools, 60 Stat. 839 (1946), 2 U.S.C.
88a; grants and loans for tuition and educational materials to private schools, regard-
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and federal programs giving money to veterans 6 for education. The
Court has not struck down these legislative programs even though
the veteran is free to attend a religiously affiliated school.97  The
voucher system is more analogous to the veteran educational assistance
programs than to the Pennsylvania or Rhode Island legislation struck
down in Lemon. However, in Tilton v. Richardson the Court distin-
guished aid to religious colleges (which veterans attend) from aid
to elementary religious schools on the grounds that elementary school
children are more impressionable and the elementary parochial schools
have a more religious atmosphere than colleges. The Court pointed out
that religiously affiliated colleges are open to students of all faiths and
there is no compulsory religious instruction.
The fact that vouchers are given to the children or their parents rather
than directly to the schools raises an issue not discussed in Lemon.
It has been suggested by Professor Choper that discrimination in al-
lowing religious organizations to provide secular services for a fee is an
infringement of the free exercise clause.98  The argument is made that
there is no "aid" to religion if the religious organization provides a
secular service and is paid no more than that which the state would have
to pay for the services itself; "compensation" is not "aid."9 9  And if
the religious group profits because it operates more efficiently, there
is still no "aid" because the government has not "given away" its re-
sources. If there is no "aid," then refusing to allow a parochial school
to participate in a voucher program is discrimination on the basis of
religion. The Supreme Court in Zorach v. Clauson'00 noted that the
first amendment does not require the government to be "hostile" to
religion. The Court in Lemon did not discuss the "compensation" ver-
sus "aid" argument. Yet the Pennsylvania statute was phrased in terms
of "compensation"; "the Superintendent of Public Instruction may pur-
chase secular educational services."
In a voucher system case the Court may not be able to ignore the
argument that refusing religious schools the opportunity to participate in
the voucher program is an infringement of the free exercise clause.
less of their religious character Korean War Veterans, 72 Stat. 1177 (1958), 38 U.S.C.
1620, and in connection with the Nation Defense Program, 72 Stat. 1590 (1958), as
amended, 20 U.S.C. 445; and loans and grants for construction by private colleges and
universities, 64 Stat. 78 (1950), as amended, 12 U.S.C. 1749a; 77 Stat. 366 (1963),
20 U.S.C. 714. For a more comprehensive list of federal projects which in part be-
stow financial aid on religious institutions, see Hearings on S. 370 Before the Subcomm.
of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., at 146-157
(1965).
96. 38 U.S.C. § 1651.
97. 38 U.S.C. § 1670, 72 Stat. 1177 Korean War Veterans Act repealed 80
Stat. 23 (1966).
98. Choper, supra note 89, at 289.
99. Id. at 265.
100. 343 U.S. 206 (1952).
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Children who want to receive their secular education at a parochial
school are being denied that opportunity if parochial schools are ex-
cluded from a voucher program. The children's argument may be
based on the free exercise clause. But the argument can be made that
the free exercise clause does not entitle one to government funds to
support the exercise of one's religion. Supporting the argument for
inclusion of parochial schools in a voucher program on free exercise
grounds would seem to be an admission that parochial school educa-
tion is religious. There would then seem to be a clear violation of this
establishment clause if parochial schools were included in a voucher
program.
The argument for including parochial schools in a voucher pro-
gram could be based on the equal protection clause.1' 1 Denying pa-
rochial schools participation in a voucher program denies them the op-
portunity to "bid" for the available funds. The schools "bid" by of-
fering a higher quality secular education to all children not just children
of one particular religious belief. This certainly seems to be a denial
of equal protection of the law; the law is discriminating against religious
schools offering secular educational services.
In dealing with a voucher system, the Court will have to balance the
religious schools' right to equal treatment from the government with the
prohibition against public aid to religion. In such a case, the excessive
entanglement criteria as applied in Lemon may be weakened; there
may not be enough excessive entanglement to justify the hostile treat-
ment of parochial schools.
California State Constitution: The Establishment Clause
The federal constitution and court interpretation provide the mini-
mum standards for maintaining the separation between church and
state. But even if a voucher system could be distinguished from the
type of aid in Lemon, it still must meet the requirements of the Cali-
fornia Constitution's establishment clause. Article XIII section 24 of
California Constitution provides:
Neither the Legislature, nor any county, city and county, town-
ship, school district, or other municipal corporation, shall ever make
an appropriation, or pay from any public fund whatever, or grant
anything to or in aid of any religious sect, church, creed, or sec-
tarian purpose, or help to support or sustain any school, college,
university, hospital, or other institution controlled by any religious
creed, church, or sectarian denomination whatever; nor shall any
101. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
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grant or donation of personal property or real estate ever made
by the state, or any city, city and county, town, or other mu-
nicipal corporation for any religious creed, church, or sectarian
purpose whatever; provided, that nothing in this section shall pre-
vent the Legislature granting aid pursuant to Section 21 of this art-
icle.
Section 21 of article XII allows the state to appropriate money to
any institution caring for orphans and blind or handicapped persons.1"'
The California supreme court in Lundberg v. County of Ala-
meda'03 held that property tax exemptions for schools owned or op-
erated by religious institutions does not violate article XIII section 24
of the California Constitution.' The court noted that section 24 of
article XIII did not expressly mention tax exemptions, but the court
pointed out that a subsequent section in the constitution specifically
provided for tax exemptions on property owned by religious organiza-
tions.1 05
Since Lundberg was a tax exemption case and there was specific
constitutional authority for religious property exemptions, proponents
of the voucher plan may be unable to rely on Lundberg as authority
for asserting the state constitutional validity of a voucher system.
The words or pay from any public fund whatever or grant anything
to or in aid of any religious sect would appear to unequivocally deny
parochial schools the opportunity to participate in a voucher system.
Of course, a court may conclude that the public funds are being given
to the child and therefore a voucher plan does not violate this con-
stitutional provision. However, the money actually goes directly to
the schools when they redeem the vouchers. In order to avoid this
problem the state could pay the money directly to the parents. Paying
the money directly to the parents would also make the voucher system
more analogous to the veteran's educational assistance plans.106 Pro-
ponents of the voucher plan can argue that the child or his parent's
freedom of choice makes direct cash payments to the parent unneces-
sary. The parent's make the "appropriation" of the public funds by
choosing a school to receive the voucher. Then the state is merely
"cashing a check." It seems evident that the proponents of the voucher
system will have to engage in these fictions and rely heavily on the child's
freedom of choice to avoid an invalidation of voucher plans on estab-
lishment clause grounds. It also seems evident that a court may well
102. CAL. CONsr. art. XII, § 21.
103. Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 46 Cal. 2d 644 (1956).
104. Id. at 655.
105. Id. at 653.
106. See note 95 supra.
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disregard the subtleties of the establishment clause arguments and
conclude that any form of "aid" to parochial schools in California is
invalid in light of the restrictive provisions of article XI section 24 of
the California Constitution. The language of this provision would make
it easy for a court to conclude the legislature intended to go beyond
the requirements of the federal constitution and to prohibit aid to re-
ligious schools in any form.
The Effect of Voucher Financing on School Segregation
Regardless of whether parochial schools will be permitted to partici-
pate in a voucher plan, the issue of state support for segregated schools
may arise under a voucher system.
Opponents of the voucher system claim that the system will in-
crease racial segregation in the schools.'0' Therefore, it is important
to determine whether the legislation will violate the equal protection
provision of the fourteenth amendment. The major decisions constru-
ing 'grant-in-aid"108 programs have come in the South, where there has
been a history of 'de jure' segregation, or segregation as a matter of
state law.
In 1954, the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Ed-
ucation,0 9 declared de jure segregation by race to be a violation of
equal protection. 1 0 The Court went on to order all schools which had
been intentionally segregated, to integrate by whatever means possible."'
107. See Report of California Teachers Association, Feb. 2, 1971, at 12, on file
in the Pacific Law Journal office.
108. Grant-in-aid programs were devices instituted in the South, similar to Cal-
ifornia's voucher proposal. The grant-in-aid plans were utilized primarily to support
the educational needs of the children attending racially segregated schools.
109. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
110. Id. at 493.
• . . [S]egregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race,
even though the physical facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be
equal, deprive the children of the minority groups of equal educational oppor-
tunities.
The Court went on to say that
. . . In these days it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected
to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an
opportunity, where the State has undertaken to provide it, is a right which
must be made available to all on equal terms.
111. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 300-301 (1955). This later
decision was a supplement to the 1954 decision (see note 110 supra). The earlier
decision had adopted the principle that racial discrimination in public education was
unconstitutional. The Court in this second Brown decision was hearing a question
over what should be the proper relief available to those harmed by the unconstitu-
tional practices.
. . [T~he courts will require that the defendants make a prompt and reason-
able starts towards full compliance with our May 17, 1954, ruling [Brown 1].
• . . The District Courts are to take such proceeding and enter such orders
and decrees consistent with this opinion which are necessary and proper to
admit to public schools on a racially non-discriminatory basis, with all de-
liberate speed, the parties to these cases.
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Most of the decisions handed down since Brown have dealt with various
grant-in-aid programs of the Southern states designed to circumvent this
ruling.1 12  In many of these cases, it was found that these plans
were designed to do indirectly that which the Brown decision had ex-
plicitly forbidden.1 13  The plans were utilized to camouflage the fact
that the black minority was still being denied the opportunity to attend
integrated public schools. 1 4
In Lee v. Macon County Board of Education"5 the plaintiffs were
challenging what they believed to be the discriminatory practice of state
officials in maintaining and operating a compulsory bi-racial school
system. The plan was a grant-in-aid program, similar to a voucher
system, which funded the educational needs of students in the racially
segregated schools. It was the conclusion of the Court
that such payments would be unconstitutional where they are de-
signed to further or have the effect of furthering said segregation
in public schools." 6
The Court in Lee dealt with a history of de jure segregation. Soon af-
ter the Lee decision the Supreme Court decided Griffin v. School Board
of Prince Edwards County." 7 The local school board had closed down
the public schools and granted aid to private schools which remained
open. These private schools practiced racial discrimination in their
admission procedures, effectively precluding the blacks in the county
from receiving a public education. The Court found this to be a denial
of the petitioner's right to equal protection."' In a later attempt to cir-
cumvent this ruling, Virgina enacted a law" 9 which granted state aid
to those children choosing to attend private, non-sectarian schools.
The plaintiffs in Griffin v. State School Board120 contended the purpose
of the act was to encourage students to choose non-integrated schools,
thereby fostering a segregated dual school system. The Court agreed and
concluded that the legislation violated the equal protection clause.'
21
In 1968, the Supreme Court construed a plan adopted by a school
112. See King, State Tuition Grants, 84 HARv. L. Rav. 1057, 1062 (March 1971).
113. Id. at 1062.
114. Id. at 1062, 1063.
115. 231 F. Supp. 743 (M.D. Ala. 1964).
116. Id. at 754. Accord, Alexander v. Holmes Co. Board of Education, 396 U.S.
19 (1969).
117. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
118. Id. at 232.
119. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-115.29 to 22-115.35 (1964).
120. 296 F. Supp. 1178 (E.D. Va. 1969). This case involved the same plaintiffs
as in the 1964 decision (see note 117 supra), challenging a different State plan
alleged to be discriminating against the minority school children of Virginia.
121. For a concise history of the Griffin litigation, see the report prepared by the
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF PUBLIC POLICY, EDUCATION VoucHERs: A PRELIMINARY
REPORT ON FINANCING EDUCATION BY PAYMENTS TO PARENTs, note 33 at 174 (1970).
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district which involved only two schools, both originally segregated.122
The question of whether under all circumstances, the school board's
adoption of a "freedom of choice" plan constituted adequate compliance
with the Board's responsibility to achieve a non-racial system of pub-
lic education was answered in the negative. During the plan's period
of operation, there was little integration of the two schools. 128  Even
though the legislature intended to comply with its duty, 2 the plan
did not achieve the intended result, and was for this reason, held to be
unconstitutional.
De Facto Segregation
In examining the preceeding decisions, it is apparent that where
there has been an affirmative duty to integrate a school system, grant-
in-aid programs as a means of achieveing such integration, are usually
unsatisfactory.
The California supreme court in Jackson v. Pasadena City School
District 25 concluded that California's school boards are under an affir-
mative duty to "take steps, insofar as reasonably feasible, to alleviate
racial imbalance in schools regardless of its cause. '1 26  The court felt
that the right to "an equal opportunity for education and the harmful
consequences of segregation" required the school boards to take "rea-
sonable" steps to eliminate de facto segregation.1 7  The California su-
preme court recently re-affirmed its position in Jackson in San Fran-
cisco Unified School Dist. v. Johnson. 28
In a recent case the Fourth District Court of Appeal 29 held that a
school district's policy of "maintaining neighborhood attendance zones,
122. Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance Committee, 275 F. Supp. 833
(E.D. La. 1967).
123. Id. at 835.
124. In a legal sense, the object or purpose of legislation is to be determined
by its natural and reasonable effect, whatever may have been the motive of
the legislature.
Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 431 (1968).
125. 59 Cal. 2d 876 (1963).
126. id. at 881.
127. Id. The court noted:
Although it is alleged that the board was guilty of intentional discriminatory
action, it should be pointed out that even in the absence of gerrymandering or
other affirmative discriminatory conduct by a school board, a student under
some circumstances would be entitled to relief where, by reason of residential
segregation, substantial racial imbalance exists in his school. .. . Where such
segregation exists it is not enough for a school board to refrain from affirm-
ative discriminatory conduct.
128. 3 Cal. 3d 937 (1971). At958 the Court said:
This court, in Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist. (citation omitted)
took a position squarely in favor of enforcing an affirmative duty to eradi-
cate school segregation regardless of cause.
129. People ex rel. Lynch v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 19 Cal. App. 3d 252
(1971).
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optional attendance zones and other devices" which perpetuate racial
imbalance is racially motivated state action.130 The court of appeal
concluded that if the board's policy is proven to perpetuate the segre-
gation and there are reasonably feasible steps which could be taken to
alleviate the racial imbalance, the board's refusal to take such steps is
a denial of equal protection.181
It seems evident from these decisions that California schools must
take affirmative action to alleviate racial imbalance where they can rea-
sonably do so. Would the schools be required to take these steps if the
racial imbalance results from a child's "freedom of choice" under a
voucher plan? The court in Jackson concluded that a duty exists to
alleviate racial imbalance regardless of cause. Therefore it would seem
that the affirmative duty would exist even though the schools partici-
pate in a "free choice" voucher plan.
Under California's voucher plan private schools, which have dis-
criminated on the basis of race in the past because there was no
"state action", will not be allowed to discriminate. Subdivision (b) of
proposed Section 31185 of the Education Code provided that schools
participating in the demonstration program could not discriminate
"against the admission of students and the hiring of teachers on the
basis of race, creed, color, national origin, economic status, religion or
political affiliation."' 32 The section further provided that the participat-
ing school must admit students from minority and ethnic groups in
"proportion as such students make application."'' 33 The schools were
also to have taken "an affirmative position to secure a racially, ethnically,
and socio-economically integrated student body which shall to the great-
est extent possible, reflect the racial, ethnic and socio-economic compo-
sition of the demonstration area!' (emphasis added). 134 These provi-
sions were presumably designed to assure that the demonstration board
complies with the mandate of Jackson. It may be argued that the
duty to take an "affirmative position" to secure racial balance is not
the same as a duty to take "reasonably feasible steps" to alleviate
imbalance. But this difference could easily be one of semantics
rather than substance.
It would appear that proposed Subdivision (b) of Section 31185
eliminates the argument that the voucher program is unconstitu-
tional because it violates the right of an equal opportunity for education.
However, the fact that the legislature included a provision to prevent
130. Id. at 268.
131. Id.
132. Proposed CAL. EDUC. CODE § 31185(b). A.B. 150, 1971 Regular Session.
133. Id.
134. Id.
Pacific Law Journal / Tol. 3
discrimination and encourage integration may defeat the arguments
that the voucher plan is not aid to religious organizations. The in-
clusion of this provision seems to be a tacit admission that the voucher
legislation is "state action". Opponents of the voucher system may
then argue the plan involves government aid to religious schools since
the inclusion of the anti-discrimination provision is recognition of
state action. If the aid involved in a voucher system is aid to the
children and not to the schools, as proponents claim, why include a pro-
vision that schools cannot discriminate? If there is no "aid" to schools,
it can be argued that the equal protection clause only requires that the
state not discriminate in awarding the vouchers. Thus, the inclusion
of the anti-discrimination provision may provide opponents of the
voucher plan with evidence in arguing the legislation is void, at least
to the extent of religious school participation.
CONCLUSION
California's experimental voucher plan may have served as a first
step in reforming the present system of financing "public" education.
In Serrano v. Priest'3 5 the California supreme court concluded that the
present system of financing public education, based upon local property
tax, is unconstitutional if it denies equal educational opportunity.'3
A voucher system can serve as an effective method of providing equal
educational opportunities throughout the state.
The legislature's intent in enacting an experimental voucher plan in
California was stated in the proposed Section 31175 of the Education
Code:
The purpose of the Elementary Demonstration Scholarship Pro-
gram is to develop and test scholarship programs as a way to im-
prove the quality of education by increasing the level of academic
achievement of the pupils involved by making schools, both public
and private, more responsive to the needs of children and parents,
to provide greater parental choice, and to determine the extent to
which the quality and delivery of educational services are affected
by economic incentives. The demonstration scholarship program
authorized by this chapter shall be used exclusively to aid stu-
dents.' 37
It can be argued that parochial school participation in the program
would not violate the establishment clause because the money "shall be
used exclusively to aid students." Therefore, a child benefit theory can
135. 5 Cal. 3d 584 (1971).
136. Id. at 589.
137. See A.B. 150, 1971 Regular Session.
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be used to counter the argument that a voucher plan violates the
state and federal constitution by "aiding" religion. Although the
voucher plan may have a secular legislative purpose (improving the
quality of education) which neither advances nor inhibits religion (use
of the funds is limited to secular education), the plan may involve an
excessive state entanglement with religion.
The supporters of Assembly Bill 150 attempted to prevent California's
experimental voucher plan from creating this excessive entanglement
by eliminating the provision which required a separate accounting of
voucher funds. The separate accounting requirement was one of
the factors the Supreme Court utilized in the Lemon case. It can be
argued by opponents of the voucher system that there will be state en-
tanglement even though a separate accounting of voucher funds is
not required because there is still a requirement that the funds be used
solely for secular education. But proponents can claim that the
legislation "on its face" does not require an excessive entanglement;
the local districts may be able to assure the funds are used solely for
secular education without an excessive entanglement between religion
and the state.
Finally proponents of the voucher plan can argue that the children
will receive the funds rather than the teachers or schools as in the
Lemon case. Since the main purpose of a voucher plan is to allow
children to freely choose the school they wish to attend, prohibiting
them from choosing a parochial school for their secular education is
unnecessary discrimination.
Proponents of the voucher plan have a major challenge before them
in attempting to distinguish the decision in Lemon from their own
proposals. If a voucher plan is passed in the 1972 legislative session
and the plan allows parochial schools to participate, the courts may be
faced with an issue not raised in Lemon. In such a case the challenge
to the legislation could be that it is an unnecessary and arbitrary dis-
crimination against children attending parochial schools which violates
the equal protection clause.
Steven R. Van Sicklen
